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Introduction 
 
Although numerous studies investigating business strategy have been published, most have examined 
organizations in the developed world, most notably the United States (Henderson and Mitchell, 1997; 
Kotha et al., 1995). Many elements of the present consensus developed from studies of Western 
firms may be directly applicable to emerging nations (Lowe et al., 2000). Unfortunately, however, 
many of these studies have not provided complete answers to many of the core strategic dilemmas 
faced by top executives (Hambrick and Fredrickson, 2001). 
 
There is increasing evidence that strategy formulation is linked to the top executive’s personal 
philosophy and personality (Kotey and Meredith, 1997). Management’s self-interest, their 
personalities, interpretations, and influences on strategy have also been examined (Guth and 
MacMillan, 1986; Janis, 1972; Smircich and Stubbart, 1985; Walsh and Fahey, 1986). 
 
In many respects, strategic management remains an intuitive and philosophical undertaking. 
As such, strategic managers are still faced with five critical judgment calls when formulating strategy 
for their companies, each of which involves apparent contradictions that must be negotiated if a firm 
is to succeed. This paper examines the perspectives of American and Mexican managers along these 
five critical areas. Conclusions and directions for future research are also discussed. 
 
Question 1: Is strategy an art or a science? 
 
The art versus science debate is a key issue in strategy formulation. While it may appear to be an 
academic dispute at first glance, one’s perception of the strategy phenomena – and more specifically 
the process of strategy formulation – is a key building block of strategy. 
 
The difference between the art and science interpretations of strategy is substantial and noteworthy. 
According to the art perspective, the lack of environmental predictability and the fast pace of change 
render elaborate strategy planning as suspect at best. Instead, strategists should incorporate large 
doses of creativity and intuition in order to design a comprehensive strategy for the firm (Ford and 
Gioia, 2000). In contrast, followers of the science perspective see the business environment as largely 
objective, analyzable, and at least somewhat predictable. As such, strategic managers should follow a 
systematic process of environmental, competitive, and internal analysis, and build the organization’s 
strategy on this foundation (see Table I). 
Most of the strategy literature has traditionally favored the science, or planning model, whereby 
strategic managers are encouraged to systematically assess the firm’s external environment and 
evaluate the pros and cons of myriad alternatives before formulating strategy. The search for causal 
relationships and objectivity are central to the process. By definition, strategic managers should be 
trained, highly skilled analytical thinkers capable of digesting a myriad of objective data and 
translating it into a desired direction for the firm. 
 
In contrast, Mintzberg’s (1987) notion of a craftsman-encompassing individual skill, dedication, and 
perfection through mastery of detail embodies the artistic model. The strategy artist senses the state 
of the organization, interprets its subtleties, and seeks to mold its strategy like a potter molds clay. 
The artist visualizes the outcomes associated with various alternatives and ultimately charts a course  
 
TABLE I 
The art and science approaches to strategy 
 Characteristic     Art    Science 
 
 
 
based on holistic thinking, intuition, and imagination.  
 
Mintzberg (1987) coined the terms “deliberate” and “emergent” strategies in part to distinguish 
between the strategies that emanate from the two schools of thought. Nonetheless, most scholars 
continued to proceed with the assumption that deliberate strategies are preferred, and emergent 
strategies invariably result from ineffective planning and/or environmental unpredictability. 
 
The relevance of this philosophical debate is clear. “Strategy scientists” tend to minimize or reject 
altogether the role of imagination and creativity in the strategy process, and are not generally 
receptive to alternatives that emerge from any process other than a comprehensive, analytical 
approach. “Strategy artists” often view strategic planning exercises as time poorly spent and may not 
be as likely as those in the science school to make the effort necessary to maximize the value of a 
formal planning process (Hamel, 1996; Huffman, 2001). 
 
The prevailing wisdom is that strategy is both an art and a science. On the one hand, following a 
comprehensive process of strategy development and implementation is likely to improve prospects 
for success. This may be more critical for businesses that face low levels of uncertainty (Courtney et 
al., 1997). On the other hand, however, the creative dimensions of strategy, such as brainstorming 
and qualitative forecasting, should not be eschewed 
 
American and Mexican managers are similar in that both groups tend to emphasize 
compartmentalization, rationality, and objectivity in strategic decision-making. Given the recent 
trends in the United States toward creativity in strategy making, however, American managers may 
be more inclined to adopt an artistic perspective on strategy (Scarborough, 1998; Wall, 1990). 
 
 
 PROPOSITION 1. American managers will view strategy formulation more as an art than  
       will their Mexican counterparts. 
 
Question 2: Should strategies be visible or hidden? 
 
In many respects, the evidence of an organization’s strategy can be seen in its employees. Its 
customers also appreciate knowing what a company is attempting to accomplish and prospective 
investors tend to hesitate when they do not have a clear vision of the firm’s position and future 
priorities. Sharing strategic information with lower level managers and employees may enhance both 
Systematic analysis of environment  Difficult at best  Possible and essential  
Environmental predictability  Very limited  Extensive  
Perception of environment  Subjective  Objective  
Planning steps  Varies by organization;   
 no one best way  organizations  
Key intellectual influence  Imagination  Analysis  
job comprehension and organizational commitment. Hence, the arguments for a “public” strategy are 
intuitively obvious. 
 
However, a number of challenges emanate from a free dissemination of the organization’s strategy. 
Open discussion to any group outside of top management (e.g., middle managers, investors, 
community leaders, etc.) may be translated into competitive intelligence for rival firms. Participants 
in the strategy process become more attractive to other industry players and may be lured away for 
competitive reasons. As a result, most strategic managers argue for at least some degree of strategy 
privacy. 
 
The Chinese warrior Sun Tzu is often cited as an historical proponent of the hidden strategy 
perspective (Michaelson, 2001). In the military context, he argued that all war is based on deception, 
and that effective military maneuvers are ones that are not easily predicted by one’s opponent. 
Business strategists, therefore, surmise that the best strategy must be one that competitors cannot 
understand. Sharing strategic information with stakeholders ultimately aids competitors in the 
comprehension process. 
 
It is difficult to argue with this notion of deceptive strategies prima facie. However, strategic secrecy 
may not only keep a strategy hidden from those who might wish to exploit it, but also from those 
who can contribute to its development or are responsible for implementing it. However, in an 
environment where managers frequently move from one company to another, forthright strategic 
discussions with employees may ultimately result in sharing confidential strategic intentions with 
competitors. In addition, effective communication with investors and business media can be critical 
to the maintenance of a firm’s stock price, although it can involve the dissemination of sensitive 
information. 
 
In a perfect world, strategic managers would involve all key individuals in the organization, as well 
as other key stakeholders (e.g., suppliers, customers, etc.) in the strategic management process, 
without disseminating key knowledge to those who may have a current or potential competitive 
interest against the firm. Although this balancing act is difficult, if not impossible to accomplish, 
distinguishing the most critical and confidential data and decisions from that which is of little value 
or cannot be readily concealed is central to the process. Specifically, many analysts believe that 
executives should identify a narrow scope of data and competitive intelligence that should remain 
confidential to top managers, and then take steps to ensure that such information is not disseminated 
beyond the inner circle. 
 
This debate is an interesting one in the American and Mexican contexts. Formality and trust are 
central to success in the Mexican business environment. Unlike their American counterparts, 
diplomacy and the avoidance of criticism is essential to daily business activities in Mexico (Stephens 
and Greer, 1995). On the positive side, Mexican managers often operate effectively as a team. On the 
negative side, however, Mexican managers tend to avoid bad news and are prone to escalation of 
commitment to losing courses of action. 
 
Within Mexican organizations, business is conducted only with people one likes personally 
(Gutierrez, 1993). In contrast, American companies emphasize formal contracts and tend to conduct 
business wherever it is profitable (Rusted et al., 1993). A number of explanations – including the lack 
of a predictable and reliable legal system in Mexico, and the strength of 
Mexican family ties – have been proposed as explanations of this phenomenon. 
 
Nonetheless, this emphasis on formality and trust may translate into a greater emphasis on 
maintaining secrecy in strategy content. 
 
 
 PROPOSITION 2. Mexican managers will more greatly emphasize the need for strategy   
                  content to remain hidden than will their American counterparts. 
 
Question 3: Is strategic commitment more important than strategic flexibility? 
 
An organization’s strategic managers may choose to commit to a strategic course of action for an 
extended period of time and enjoy the benefits of organizational teaming and a clear customer image. 
Alternatively, an organization can remain flexible so that it does not become committed to products, 
technology, or market approaches that may become outdated. In a perfect world, organizations 
commit to predictable, successful courses of action, and strategic change is only incremental. In the 
real world, however, outcomes are not always predictable and the environment is dynamic. Hence, 
for most firms, strong arguments can usually be made for substantial strategic shifts, even when 
performance is not lacking (Grewel and Tansuhaj, 2001). 
 
Interestingly, the popular business press has been consistently inconsistent with regard to this debate 
over the years. When traditional firms perform poorly, their strategic managers are exhorted to 
promote flexibility and strategic renewal to improve profitability. In contrast, when bold strategic 
changes fail, pundits assert that a company must return to its “core business.” Hence, it is easy to 
migrate freely from one side of the debate to the other, often with convincing empirical and 
intuitively appealing arguments. 
 
Proponents of the strategic change and flexibility school make four primary arguments. First, 
strategies tend to yield superior performance when implemented in appropriate environments. 
Without strategic flexibility, an organization cannot adapt to its changing external environment 
(Parnell, 1997). Even if an organization’s strategy is effectively aligned with its environment, an 
environmental shift may necessitate strategic change to maintain alignment (Hannan and Freeman, 
1977; Ulrich, 1987; Whipp et al., 1989; Wemerfelt and Kamani, 1987). 
 
Second, an organization can seek first mover advantages by entering a new market or develop a new 
product or service prior to the competition (Gannon et al., 1992; Petersen and Welch, 2000). Being a 
first mover can help secure access to scarce resources, increase the organization’s knowledge base, 
and result in substantial long term competitive advantage, especially when switching costs are high 
(Lieberman and Montgomery, 1988; Mascarenhas, 1992). 
 
Third, an organization must modify its strategy as its set of unique human, physical, capital, and 
informational resources change (Barney, 1991; Lado et al., 1992). Proponents of the resource based 
view of strategy have noted that competitive advantage often occurs from such organizational 
attributes as informational asymmetries (Barney, 1986), culture (Fiol, 1991), resource accumulation 
(Dierickx and Cool, 1989), and the minimization of transaction costs (Camerer and Vepsalainen, 
1988), and that strategies should reflect change in these capabilities. Resource shifts necessitating 
strategic change may be more prevalent in some organizations than in others (Hitt et al., 1998). 
 
In a similar vein, strategic change can improve an organization’s ability to adapt by forcing healthy 
changes within the business. The initial pain associated with change may be offset by the emergence 
of a lean, rejuvenated organization with a fresh focus on its goals and objectives. On the contrary, 
organizations that maintain strategic consistency over time may become stagnant, limiting the 
creativity and potential contributions of its members. 
 
Fourth, strategic changes may be necessary if desired performance levels are not being attained by 
the organization. In many cases, top managers may believe that a change in strategy will improve the 
ability of the business to generate revenues or profits, increase market share, and/or improve return 
on assets or investment. Many studies have concluded that declining profitability is the most 
common catalyst for strategic change (Backer, 1989; Webb and Dawson, 1991). Interestingly, 
organizational performance, age, and length of tenure of the founding entrepreneur influence the 
degree to which a founding strategy endures and thus, the prospects for strategic change (Boeker, 
1989). In fact, new CEOs are often recruited to attempt strategic changes upon entering the 
organization (Greiner and Bhambri, 1989). 
 
Proponents of the strategic consistency school argue for strategy stability on four grounds. First, a 
change in any key strategic, environmental, or organizational factor may entice strategic managers in 
a business to modify its strategy to incorporate these changes. However, since such variables are 
constantly evolving, this is challenging process, and inaction may minimize uncertainty. Indeed, a 
strategic change is most risky when competitors are better equipped to respond if it is successful 
(Wemerfelt and Kamani, 1987). Further, a successful strategic change is often seen as unsuccessful 
in the short run, and therefore must endure efforts to return to the former strategy when 
organizational “losers” – typically those whose careers may suffer as a result of the change-will 
mount a stiff opposition (Gaertner, 1989; Yoshihara, 1990). Further, strategic change can challenge 
the assumptions of all organizational members and may be difficult to implement even with 
employee support (Saffold, 1988; Scholes, 1991). 
 
Second, it is likely that measures required to implement a change in strategy may necessitate 
substantial outlays of capital. For example, a shift from a prospector or analyzer strategy to a 
defender strategy may require investments in sophisticated production equipment to lower production 
costs, a characteristic more important to effective implementation of a defender strategy (Miles and 
Snow, 1978). Likewise, a shift from a defender or analyzer strategy to a prospector strategy may 
require outlays to develop or enhance research and development facilities. 
 
Third, consumer confusion may result from strategic change. For example, if a business employing a 
low cost strategy attempts to switch to a differentiation strategy, its price-oriented customers may 
become confused and leave in pursuit of another low cost leader, while those willing to pay a 
premium price for differentiated products may not recognize the organization’s strategic change. 
Many will likely recall remnants of the previous strategy – perhaps advertising campaigns – and may 
not even consider a transaction with the organization. 
 
Finally, even when strategic change results in a successful new product or service, there is no 
assurance that this success can be maintained. Indeed, competitors may distort consumer perceptions 
and reap the benefits of the initial strategic change. For example, a number of consumer goods 
companies are “imitators” (Foxman et al., 1990), and many consumers purchase the imitation 
product thinking it is the original. If the consumer dislikes the product, this dissatisfaction can be 
transferred to the original. If the consumer likes the product, the consumer may realize that the 
product is an imitator and transfer the positive associations with the original product to that of the 
imitator. Either scenario can prove costly to the originator (Loken et al., 1986). 
 
Unlike their American counterparts, Mexican managers are trained for survival in turbulent 
environments (Kras, 1995). This stark difference in the American and Mexican planning 
environments may place a premium on flexibility as part of any effective strategy. In the U.S., 
sacrificing agility for efficiency may be a viable tradeoff in many industries. The predictability of the 
American business environment coupled with sophisticated forecasting techniques may serve as the 
structural foundation for the defender approach. As such, Mexican managers would be expected to 
emphasize flexibility in strategy content more than American managers. 
 
 
 PROPOSITION 3. Strategic flexibility will be emphasized more by Mexican managers than   
                 by their American counterparts. 
 
Question 4: What degree of risk is inherent in strategy formulation? How much competitive 
intelligence is enough? 
 
Strategy is about making choices (Porter, 1985), some of which appear to be riskier than others. 
Environmental scanning is at best an inexact science, and strategic managers are inevitably left with 
varying amounts of risk and uncertainty associated with each strategic alternative they possess. 
According to one school of thought, strategy formulation is inherently risky, and top managers 
should not forego attractive opportunities because of a lack of certainty. However, a second school 
contends that risk reduction is the primary responsibility of top management. Executives, therefore, 
should be skilled at processing information so that risk can be avoided – or at least severely 
minimized – in strategy formulation. 
 
The current trend toward the acknowledgement of risk notwithstanding, fast-food giant McDonald’s 
historically has eschewed risk in strategy making, opting instead to promote and expand its concept 
of consistent, quality hamburgers and related food products. Although McDonald’s is generally 
considered to be a successful firm, it is interesting to note, however, that of its three most substantial 
innovations over the past three decades – the Big Mac, the Egg McMuffin, and Chicken McNuggets 
– two were invented by franchisees and the third was launched by the company only after seven 
years of testing (Ghemawat and Khanna, 2000). 
 
The literature concerning risk and strategy formulation among Mexican executives is not well 
developed. As such, it is proposed that no significant differences in risk tendency will exist between 
the two groups. 
 
 
 PROPOSITION 4. There will be no significant differences in risk perceptions between  
                  American and Mexican managers. 
 
Question 5: Should top-down or bottom-up approaches to strategy formulation be utilized? 
 
Most scholars agree that at least some nonexecutive level managers should be involved in the 
strategy formulation process. The key issue, however, is the most appropriate degree of involvement. 
Top-down proponents argue that seasoned executives are the only ones in the organization with the 
collective experience, acumen, and fiduciary responsibility required to chart the strategy. In contrast, 
bottom-up proponents argue that a strategy eventually must be implemented by middle- and lower-
level managers, whom therefore should play a central role in its development. 
 
Indeed, research has more greatly emphasized the role of multiple managers in building the superior 
performing organization (Hurst et al., 1990; Markoczy, 2001; Sayles, 1993; Wooldridge 1990; 
Wright et al., 1990). However, much of the strategy research in the 1970s and early 1980s followed 
Ansoff (1965) and others (Andrews, 1971; Schendel and Hofer, 1979), relying on perceptions of the 
top manager for insight into an organization’s strategic intentions. Although the concept of middle 
management involvement in strategy is not a recent phenomenon, the last decade has produced 
evidence to suggest that strategy formulation and implementation can reflect a diverse array of top 
and middle management inputs (Hart, 1992; Hiam, 1993; Westphal and Fredrickson, 2001). 
Mintzberg and Waters’ (1985) notion of deliberate and emergent strategies acknowledges the 
significant role of top and middle managers in the strategic management process. As Nichol (1992, p. 
27) observed, strategy synchronization is a team effort, requiring contributions and knowledge from 
both middle and senior managers. 
 
Leadership styles in the United States tend to be participative whereas autocratic and paternalistic 
styles are more common in Mexico (Morales, 1997). Anecdotal evidence suggests that participative 
styles are becoming more popular in Mexico, but change has been slow has is not widely seen in the 
strategy formulation process (Bailey, 1993; Kras, 1995; Nichols et al., 1999). This difference may be 
linked to competing perspectives on loyalty, as loyalty to one’s immediate superior and organization 
is more widely valued among Mexican firms (Gutierrez, 1993). 
 
 
 PROPOSITION 5. Mexican managers will emphasize top management control of the strategy  
                  formulation process more than their American counterparts will. 
 
Methods 
 
Between six and ten items were developed as potential measures for each of the five factors. An 
initial survey of all of the items was administered to 177 managers in the southeastern United States. 
Following the initial data analysis, a number of items were eliminated based on wording, loading, or 
redundancy concerns. In the interest of parsimony, three items were selected as measures for each 
factor. The resulting survey instrument contained these fifteen items, as well as a previously 
validated three-item scale to measure satisfaction with organizational performance (Parnell, 2000; 
Parnell and Carraher, 2002). 
 
To test the propositions, the final instrument was administered to 402 middle and upper level 
managers from Texas and Mexico. 57% (229) of whom reported American citizenship, 43% (173) 
Mexican citizenship. 68% of the respondents were male, 32% female. The Mexican managers were 
fluent in English and well-versed in American business practices. 
 
Respondents represented a variety of industries. Although this phenomenon introduces some degree 
of cross-industry variation into the study, the constructs and relationships were hypothesized to be 
consistent across industries. Although support for relationships with a cross industry sample can be 
more difficult to engender, doing so can lend greater credence to the generalizability of the findings.  
 
The principal components (Harman and Jones, 1966) factor extraction technique resulted in single 
factor loadings in the five scales ranging from 0.535 to 0.842 (see Table II). Scholars and statisticians 
have suggested desired minimum loadings ranging from 0.500 to 0.700. Coefficient alpha (Cronbach, 
1951) for the scales ranged from 0.513 to 0.652, indicating that the scales have a moderate level of 
internal consistency, an important indication of reliability (Kuratko et al., 1990; Peter, 1979). 
TABLE II 
Results of factor analyses 
     Item                Summary      Loading 
 
ART subscale (alpha = 0.5814) 
 
ART1    Strategies should be meticulously planned     0.636 
ART2    Strategy formulation is an art       0.764 
ART3   Strategy formulation should be approached as a scientific process   0.805 
 
HIDE subscale (alpha = 0.5214) 
 
HIDE1    Keep the details of strategies secret      0.651 
HIDE2    Communicate openly the details of strategies to employees    0.660 
HIDE3    Communicate the details of strategies to the media    0.737 
 
FLEX subscale (alpha = 0.6518) 
 
FLEX1    Strategies should remain flexible so that they can easily change   0.761 
FLEX2    Stick to the strategy over the long term      0.719 
FLEX3    Maintain consistency in strategies over time     0.842 
 
RISK subscale (alpha = 0.5479) 
 
RISK1    Risk cannot and should not be avoided when formulating strategies   0.699 
RISK2    Responsibility of the executive to reduce risks inherent in strategy   0.535 
RISK3    A certain amount of risk is inevitable      0.780 
 
TOP subscale (alpha = 0.5128) 
 
TOP1    Strategies should be handed down from the top     0.728 
TOP2    Maximum input from all employees in the organization    0.663 
TOP3    Executives should develop strategies for the company    0.742 
 
PERSAT subscale (alpha = 0.7747) 
 
PERSAT1   Satisfied with current profitability of my company     0.842 
PERSAT2   Satisfied with the current growth of my company     0.871 
PERSAT3   Satisfied with the current non-financial performance of my company  0.777 
 
 
The three-item scale to measure satisfaction with performance produced loadings ranging from 0.777 
to 0.842, with a coefficient alpha of 0.775. Factor scores (regression method) were computed to serve 
as composite measures for each of the factors. 
 
An analysis of variance (ANOVA) model was applied to test for differences in the five measures 
between the American and Mexican managers (see Table III). Significant differences at the 0.05 
level were found in three of the five factors. Interestingly, no significant difference was found 
between the two groups in performance satisfaction. 
 
 
TABLE III 
ANOVA: Factor scores for American vs. Mexican managers 
 Variable  American mean  Mexican mean  F-statistic  P-value 
 
ART 0     0.126    –0.186 0   9.888    0.002 
HIDE    –0.101 0    0.127 0   5.125     0.024 
FLEX    00.173                –0.266    19.530     0.000 
RISK 0     0.037    –0.023 0    0.342     0.559 
TOP    –0.060 0    0.124 0    0.342     0.559 
PERSAT               –0.079 0    0.082 0    2.542     0.112  
 
 
Findings and discussion 
 
The first proposition was supported. American managers were more likely to perceive strategy 
formulation as an art, whereas their Mexican counterparts viewed strategy formulation more as a 
science. As such, the data supports a number of previous findings. 
 
The second proposition was not supported. American managers were more likely to believe that 
strategy content should be open, whereas their Mexican counterparts tended to emphasize the need to 
keep content hidden.  
 
The third proposition was not supported. American managers were more likely to emphasize 
strategic flexibility, whereas their Mexican counterparts emphasized strategic consistency. Indeed, 
such commitment by Mexican firms to a set of core strategic principles can pay dividends to an 
organization by focusing its employees on a clear goal and increasing its predictability among 
customers and other key stakeholders. However, organizations must be capable of embracing 
positive change. The key for strategic managers is to identify the critical strategic parameters that 
should define the organization (e.g., quality, value, servicing a specific market niche, etc.), and 
promote flexibility within them. 
 
The fourth proposition was supported. No significant difference was found between the American 
and Mexican managers along the dimension of risk. Strategic managers have a number of analytical 
and qualitative techniques at their disposal to transform their strategic environments in the direction 
of certainty. Strategic managers must identify key decision criteria and then develop systematic 
resources to glean current and reliable data that can readily drive these decisions. Acceptance of this 
view appeared to be equally accepted by American and Mexican managers. 
 
The fifth proposition was not supported. No significant difference was found between the American 
and Mexican managers along the dimension of top management control of the process. This may be 
due to the fact that there is increasing evidence of increased participative management styles among 
managers in Mexican firms. Even the notion of self-managed work teams is gaining steam among 
Mexican organizations. For example, in one Sara Lee Knit Products plant, four managers are 
responsible for a work force of 900 production workers. Teams make decisions about production, 
technology, and even compensation (DeWitt, 1995; Stephens and Greer, 1995). Mexican workers 
have been found to value the interesting nature of work, quality production, and opportunities for 
learning (Noll, 1992). At least in the context of the present sample, the increase in participation may 
extend into strategic decision-making as well. 
 
Historically speaking, the trend toward bottom-up approaches to decision making is a recent 
phenomenon in the United States. Following this logic, executives should establish the strategy 
because they have the expertise and experience to “see the big picture.” In many respects, this 
argument is still true. However, the increased education of the work force at all levels and the general 
trend toward decentralization over the past two decades suggest that a strict top-down approach may 
not yield the best strategy. American and Mexican managers appear to be equally split on this issue. 
 
 
Conclusions and directions for future research 
 
The academic answers to these key strategy dilemmas may be elusive, but two basic considerations 
govern the strategic manager’s approach to them. First, the validity of the opposite extremes suggests 
that a working balance must be sought between the apparent contradictions. Second, each top 
executive must understand how the unique business environment in which he or she operates 
influences the proper response. 
 
The findings in this study suggest that conventional wisdom on the nature of strategic management in 
Mexican firms (as compared to the U.S.) may not be true or may be changing. Specifically, the 
increased interest among Mexican managers in maintaining hidden strategies and strategic 
consistency is most noteworthy. 
 
It is unlikely that research will substantially reduce the responsibility of top executives with respect 
to these five judgment calls. Nonetheless, a number of research implications emanate from an 
understanding of these critical issues. Scholars must recognize the assumptions on which their 
research programs are based and seek to address issues inherent in these assumptions. Failing to do 
so can severely limit or even eliminate the practical applications of their research, especially for 
managers who do not share their philosophical perspective. 
 
Considering the art-science debate as an example, strategic managers who adopt the “strategy as art” 
perspective may not be willing to consider findings associated with the planning perspective. New or 
modified planning approaches will likely be seen as cumbersome, academic exercises devoid of 
practical relevance. In this case, researchers can strengthen the relevance and acceptance of their 
findings by addressing these concerns directly and, if possible, incorporating aspects of the 
alternative perspectives into their research designs and/or considerations of managerial implications. 
 
A number of future research issues have been identified. First, the findings in the present study 
suggest that the Mexican philosophical approach to strategy is not well understood. Additional 
research on Mexican firms and industries could expand this knowledge, as well as assist both 
Mexican managers and those who work with them in understanding the perspectives they hold, and 
the advantages and disadvantages of each. 
 
Second, managerial consensus-the degree to which managers agree on strategy-is a key consideration 
is the strategy measurement process (Bowman and Ambrosini, 1997; Thomas and Ramaswamy, 
1996). This study did not address the extent to which managers in the same company might share a 
common philosophical approach. 
 
Third, the measurement of performance has also plagued strategy researchers for more than two 
decades (Venkatraman and Ramanujam, 1986). While strategy researchers struggle with various 
performance measures such as return-on-assets, stock price and revenue growth, many companies are 
beginning to use a mixture of financial and non-financial measures for performance (Kaplan and 
Norton, 1997). Most researchers agree that multiple measures offer a rich perspective that cannot be 
seen by a single approach. 
 
However, a consensus on which combination is most appropriate has not yet emerged (Wiliford, 
1997). Although the present study considered only performance satisfaction, research in the field 
should follow a hybrid approach that is less susceptible to validity or reliability concerns associated 
with a single method. 
 
Finally, the present study considered responses from managers from a variety of industries. As such, 
some factors associated with the perceptions of strategy and performance maybe industry-specific. 
Although the cross-industry approach has its advantages, additional studies that test for similar 
relationships within specific industries would be helpful. 
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